Introduction

1
It is a privilege to be invited to deliver this 7th lecture in the series of annual lectures in honour of Sir Gerard Brennan. His great contribution to the law in Australia is too well known to repeat. I am also honoured to be presenting the lecture under the auspices of the Bond University Law School on the occasion of its 20th anniversary. 2 My topic concerns the interface of international and domestic law, a subject to which Sir Gerard made a substantial contribution. In his historic judgment in Mabo, he referred to the decline of the concept of terra nullius at international law and its implications for the common law of Australia 1 . His frequently quoted observation about the effect of international law on the development of the common law was no mere rhetorical flourish. He said 2 :
The common law does not necessarily conform with international law, but international law is a legitimate and important influence on the development of the common law, especially when international law declares the existence of universal human rights. A common law doctrine founded on unjust discrimination in the enjoyment of civil and political rights demands reconsideration.
-3 -to offer an overview of some issues surrounding the nature of international law and its sources, and the ways in which it impacts upon Australian domestic law. 4 It is important at the outset that we recognise that the story about the role of international law and our domestic law is not told simply by describing its consideration in the courts. Much of the interaction takes place at the level of legislative, administrative and commercial practice which will never see the inside of a courtroom.
5
It is also important that we do not allow legal insularity to hamper our national engagement with international legal systems. We should derive from these systems such benefits as they may offer to the development of our own law and our more effective interaction with other countries, particularly those in our region. Insularity is seen by some astute Australian observers as a current and significant impediment to a fuller and more beneficial engagement. Chief Justice Spigelman speaking earlier this month at Sydney University Law School, referred to the importance of a global perspective on commercial matters and expressed regret "that there are still areas of the law which remain inward looking and parochial. From time to time there emerge particular reforms that indicate a global outlook, but they occur on an ad hoc basis in particular categories of reference" 9 .
Justice Paul Finn has also drawn attention to barriers to Australian engagement in areas of international legal thought which have the potential to bear upon the shaping and development of our common law. He has focussed particularly on the law of contract and its self-evident international dimension. He said and I agree 10 :
This international dimension is becoming of increasing importance as international commercial law falls increasingly under the influence of internationally accepted general principles and trade practices and usages, particularly in the context of international commercial arbitration.
The character of international law 6 The concept of international law is elusive. The legitimacy of its claim to be law has 10 Public Law Review 185. been questioned since it first became a subject of study. In 1625, Hugo Grotius said 11 :
… there is no lack of men who view this branch of law with contempt as having no reality outside of an empty name.
Grotius' work Law of War and Peace, has been called "first systematic exposition" 12 of international law. 7 One hundred and fifty years after Grotius, Blackstone, perhaps optimistically, defined international law by reference to rationality, consent and natural justice. He described it as "a system of rules, deducible by natural reason, and established by universal consent among the civilized inhabitants of the world…" 13 . These rules could not be dictated by one State to another but necessarily resulted from principles of natural justice agreed upon by "the learned of every nation" or "on compacts or treaties". Now, nearly 400 years after Grotius and "… a standard of conduct, at a given time, for states and other entities subject thereto. A notable shift was from "law" to "rules" to "a standard of conduct".
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The system of international law was described in 1960 by Hersch Lauterpacht, one of the foremost jurists in the field, as "immature" in character, imprecise and uncertain in its rules. It lacked the legislature, an executive and a judiciary with compulsory jurisdiction. It is indeed arguable … that international law not only lacks the secondary rules of change and adjudication which provide for legislature and courts, but also a unifying rule of recognition specifying 'sources' of law and providing general criteria for the identification of its rules. These differences are indeed striking and the question 'is international law really law' can hardly be put aside. In a government of laws we do not authorise officials to depart from domestic law to promote certain urgent policies. Can we find a rationale for such departure for international law? Are we prepared to acknowledge that international law is less binding upon government officials than domestic law. A feature of all organised legal communities is that commands properly issued will be obeyed. It has remained true that most States abide by the rules of international law almost all of the time.
Her contention about the extent to which international law works in practice must be As a result, constitutional law suffers from the same kinds of foundational uncertainty and contestation over meaning that are viewed as characteristic of international law. Constitutional law also shares with international law the absence of an enforcement authority capable of coercing powerful political actors to comply with unpopular decisions.
It seems, however, something of an over-generalisation to propose that the basic features of international law which call into question its efficacy and legitimacy are shared by constitutional law generally 29 . After all, there are constitutions and then there are constitutions. This brings me to the Australian Constitution and its nature and, relevantly to the present topic, whether and how it interfaces with international law.
International law and the interpretation of the Constitution
The Australian Constitution is statutory in origin. It is part of an Act of the United It is not a supreme law purporting to obtain its force from the direct expression of a peoples' inherent authority to constitute a government. It is a statute of the British Parliament enacted in the exercise of its legal sovereignty over the law everywhere in the King's Dominions.
If viewed simply as a statute, the occasions for the application to its construction of the rules of international law would seem to be limited to those rules which predated its coming into 
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In rejecting a construction of a National Security Act which would have accorded with international law, the Court accepted the applicability of the well-established rule of statutory interpretation expressed by Dixon J that 32 :
… unless a contrary intention appear, general words occurring in a statute are to be read subject to the established rules of international law and not as intended to apply to persons or subjects which, according to those rules, a national law of the kind in question ought not to include.
In relation to the effect of the rule of international law upon the scope of the constitutional 30 Dixon , "The Law and the Constitution" (1935) The contention that s 51(vi) of the Constitution [the defence power] should be read as subject to the same implication, in my opinion, ought not to be countenanced. The purpose of Part V of Chapter I of the Constitution is to confer upon an autonomous government plenary legislative power over the assigned subjects. Within the matters placed under its authority, the power of the Parliament was intended to be supreme and to construe it down by reference to the presumption is to apply to the establishment of legislative power a rule for the construction of legislation passed in its exercise. It is nothing to the point that the Constitution derives its force from an Imperial enactment. It is none the less a constitution.
Rich J in similar vein would not construe the legislative powers of the Commonwealth as "anything but as plenary and ample within their ambit 'as the Imperial Parliament in the plenitude of its power possessed and could bestow'" 34 . Starke J also rejected the proposition that the legislative power of the Commonwealth and its legislation "… is limited by or must be construed so as not to contravene the rules of the law of nations". He said 35 :
So to limit the constitutional power of sovereign States or their subordinate authorities denies the supremacy of those States within their own territory, which is contrary to the principles of the law of nations itself. And to refuse to give words in legislation their grammatical and ordinary signification because of some practice or rule of the law of nations is contrary, as I think, to settled principles of construction. Cases of ambiguity I leave on one side, for there is no ambiguity in the meaning of the present regulations.
The common theme of the court's rejection of the proposition that limitations derived from international law were imposed upon the law making power of the Commonwealth was that the grant of power to the parliament was plenary. It was not in that respect a lesser parliament than its progenitor. … a world of legal fiction in which there are no boundaries except, practically, political power and, theoretically, the limits of imagination.
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Professor Winterton's caution might raise the question whether the interpretation of a constitution based upon popular sovereignty could be informed by such shifting conceptions as "community values" or "community attitudes" and thereby rendered more permeable to international influences than the constitution regarded simply as a statutory instrument.
Some might also say in such a case, that a shift of the foundation of the constitutional authority into popular sovereignty would bring it within the scope of the Goldsmith and
Levinson analogy, and difficulties of the kind that attach to the sources and determination of international law. It seems to me that whatever view is taken of the source of authority of the Constitution today, contestation over meaning is inevitable. The sources from which international law is derived include treaties between various States, State papers, municipal Acts of Parliament and the decisions of municipal Courts and last, but not least, opinions of jurisconsults or text-book writers. It is a process of inductive reasoning.
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The disparate sources and want of a legislature, an executive and a defining supranational judiciary had its own impact on the attitude of the Privy Council in the process of ascertaining the content of international law. Viscount Sankey went on to say 42 :
Speaking generally, in embarking upon international law, their Lordships are to a great extent in the realm of opinion, and in estimating the value of opinion it is permissible not only to seek a consensus of views, but to select what appear to be the better views upon the question. There is a basic set of recognised sources which appear to be largely common ground. … the law of nations (wherever any question arises which is properly the subject of its jurisdiction) is here adopted in its full extent by the common law, and is held to be a part of the law of the land.
Statutes to enforce the "universal law" were merely "declaratory of the old fundamental constitutions of the kingdom; without which it must cease to be part of the civilized world".
Examples of the applications of the law merchant as a branch of the law of nations were cited such as bills of exchange and marine causes. In disputes about prizes, ship wrecks, hostages and ransom bills 47 :
… there is no other rule of decision but this great universal law, collected from history and usage and such writers of all nations and languages as are generally approved and allowed of. 
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It has been said that the statement of the dualist principle was beside the point because the rule of international law propounded in the Franconia case was too uncertain and unsettled to be adopted by the court. Lauterpacht wrote 51 :
It is clear … that the insistence on the necessity for an act of parliament was due not to the desire to challenge the established doctrine enunciated by Blackstone, but to the uncertainty of international law on the subject.
Professor Ian Brownlie has argued, in like vein, that Cockburn CJ's judgment is consistent with a doctrine of incorporation "if it is seen that he was concerned with the proof of the rules of international law". 52 Brownlie wrote:
Yet as a general condition he does not require express assent or a factual transformation by act of parliament. In case of first impression the courts are ready to apply international law without looking for evidence of assent. 3. Absent parliamentary incorporation by legislation of a convention which has been ratified by Australia, the terms of the convention may still be used in interpreting domestic legislation. The underlying principle is that parliament should be presumed as intending to legislate in accordance with, and not in conflict with, international law.
4.
In some cases a statute may adopt the language of a convention in anticipation of Australian ratification. The provisions of the convention may be used to assist resolution of an ambiguity in the interpretation of the statute but not so as to displace its plain words.
5.
Administrative decision-makers may have regard, in exercising discretions under international law to international obligations or agreements which have not been incorporated into the domestic law.
6. There may be cases in which an expression used in a domestic statute is given the meaning it bears in a particular convention.
Incorporation of customary international law
The question whether, and if so how, customary international law impacts on … in Ching three of five judges found that Australian common law could contain customary rules. The question was whether this occurred automatically through qualified incorporation (as Latham CJ and Starke J appeared to hold), or only when a judicial act created a new domestic rule from the 'source' of international law (as Dixon J appeared to find).
Dixon J, in a passage frequently cited, said:
The theory of Blackstone that 'the law of nations (whenever any question arises which is properly the object of its jurisdiction) is here adopted in its full extent by the common law, and is held to be a part of the law of the land' is now regarded as without foundation. The true view, it is held, is 'that international law is not a part, but is one of the sources, of English law'. In each case in which the question arises the court must consider whether the particular rule of international law has been received into, and so become a source of, English law.
It has been suggested that Dixon J's comments are indicative of a 'soft' version of either the incorporation or transformation theory 57 . Others are of the opinion that the source view is broadly consistent with transformation because it requires a judicial act to implement customary international law into domestic law.
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The proposition that a rule of customary international law could be incorporated directly into the common law of Australia to create a criminal offence was rejected by the the difficulties associated with the incorporation theory and proof of customary international law suggest that, in Australia, the transformation theory holds sway.
He referred also to the difficulty of making a general statement covering the diverse rules of international customary law 65 :
It is one thing, it seems to me, for courts of a particular country to be prepared to treat a civil law rule like the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity as part of its domestic law, whether because it is accepted by those courts as being 'incorporated' in that law or because it has been 'transformed' by judicial act. It is another thing to say that a norm of international law criminalising conduct that is not made punishable by the domestic law entitles a domestic court to try and punish an offender against that law.
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Merkel J dissented and held that the offence did exist at common law. He did this on the basis that:
(i) International customary civil law and criminal law relating to universal crimes can be adopted and received into Australian domestic law without legislation by recognition and adoption into the common law by domestic courts.
(ii) Such a rule of international customary law will be adopted and received into domestic law if it is not inconsistent with domestic law, the policy of the common law or public policy.
(iii) Adoption of the universal crime of genocide was not inconsistent with domestic rules enacted by statute or any requirement of the common law in respect of a crime.
(iv) Adoption of the universal crime of genocide was also not inconsistent with public policy. characteristic features of the particular national legal system in view. Looking at it simply from the point of view of English law, the answer would seem to be no; international law could not create a crime triable directly, without the intervention of parliament, in an English court. What international law could, however, do is to perform its well-understood validating function, by establishing the legal basis (legal justification) for Parliament to legislate, so far as it purports to exercise control over the conduct of non-nationals abroad. This answer is inevitably tied up with the attitude taken towards the possibility of the creation of new offences under common law.
And further:
There are, besides, powerful reasons of political accountability, regularity and legal certainty for saying that the power to create crimes should now be regarded as reserved exclusively to Parliament, by statute.
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I express no view on the questions raised in Nulyarimma or for that matter Jones, save to say that they illustrate some of the difficulties associated with the interaction between customary international law and domestic law so far as it is sought to give direct effect to customary international law in municipal courts.
International law and the interpretation of statutes
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The effects of rules of international law and obligations on the interpretation of statutes has already been referred to. These may interact to a degree with other common law rules affecting statutory interpretation. One area which awaits further exploration is the interface between human rights norms in Conventions to which Australia is a party or in customary international law and the presumption against statutory displacement of fundamental rights and freedoms of the common law. If the former can inform the latter through developmental processes of the kind mentioned in Mabo then the content of the socalled principle of legality may be deepened. unnoticed in the democratic process. In the absence of express language or necessary implication to the contrary, the courts therefore presume that even the most general words were intended to be subject to the basic rights of the individual.
It was described by Gleeson CJ as 69 :
… not merely a commonsense guide to what a Parliament in a liberal democracy is likely to have intended; it is a working hypothesis, the existence of which is known both to Parliament and the courts, upon which statutory language will be interpreted. The hypothesis is an aspect of the rule of law.
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Freedom of expression is one such fundamental freedom by the common law 70 .
Another is personal liberty 71 . It does not take a great stretch of the imagination to visualise intersections between these fundamental rights and freedoms, long recognised by the common law, and the fundamental rights and freedoms which are the subject of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and subsequent international Conventions to which Australia is a party. 
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The validity of the Act was upheld by a 4/3 majority in the High Court as an exercise of the external affairs power giving effect to international obligations under the Convention.
Stephen J referred to the idea of racial equality as the one which more than any other had come to dominate the thoughts and actions of the post-World War II world. He said 74 :
In our time, the idea of racial equality has acquired far greater force than its eighteenth-century companions of (personal) liberty and fraternity. The aim of racial equality has permeated the law-making, the standard-setting and the standard-applying activities of the United Nations family of organisations since 1945.
He went on to say that even were Australia not a party to the Convention, it would not necessarily exclude the topic of racial discrimination as part of its external affairs upon which the Commonwealth would have power to legislate. The Commonwealth had argued that the norm of non-discrimination on the grounds of race had become part of customary international law. Stephen J said 75 :
There is, in my view, much to be said for this submission and for the conclusion that, the Convention apart, the subject of racial discrimination should be regarded as an important aspect of Australia's external affairs, so that legislation much in the present form of the Racial Discrimination Act would be supported by power conferred by s 51(xxix). As with slavery and genocide, the failure of a nation to take steps to suppress racial discrimination has become of immediate relevance to its relations within the international community. 45 The Racial Discrimination Act being a valid exercise of Commonwealth legislative power in reliance upon Australia's international obligations, State laws inconsistent with it would be invalid to the extent of the inconsistency by virtue of s 109 of the Constitution.
This became important for the protection of native title rights and interests. In practical terms, this means that if traditional native title was not extinguished before the Racial Discrimination Act came into force, a State law which seeks to extinguish it now will fail. 
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What may be seen at work here is a fascinating interaction between international law, the Commonwealth Constitution, statute law and the common law.
Conclusion
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The legislative incorporation of treaties and conventions and the acceptance of customary international law extends well beyond the fields I have surveyed. Judges, private and government legal practitioners, academics, lawyers and people in many walks of private life will and have encountered some of the immense variety of legislation which involves the application of international Conventions and Treaties. This legislation is to be found not only in Commonwealth statutes but also in State laws. I have already referred in opening to the range of topics upon which our domestic law intersects with international law.
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That intersection is multifaceted, complex and difficult to encompass within any all embracing theory. 80 There is no doubt a continuing need for greater consciousness of it in our legal community and of the opportunities and challenges which it presents. 
